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Gradual Nash Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda:
A Path-Dependent Model




This article proposes a method for considering the bargaining agenda as
an endogenous phenomenon in gradual bargaining games, understood as be-
ing path-dependent processes. Some short, medium and long-term results for
bargaining are presented, as well as a possible application for the model.
JEL classiﬁcation: C60, C71, C78.
Keywords: bargaining games, path-dependent processes.
1 Introduction
Bargaining games refer to situations where two or more players must reach agree-
ment regarding how to distribute an object or monetary amount. Each player prefers
to reach an agreement in these games, rather than abstain from doing so; however,
each prefers that agreement which most favours his interests. Examples of such sit-
uations would be the bargaining involved in a labour union and the directors of a
company negotiating wage increases, the dispute between two communities about the
distribution of a common territory or the conditions under which two countries can
start a programme of nuclear disarmament. Analyzing these kinds of problem looks
for a solution specifying which component in dispute will correspond to each party
involved.
Players in a bargaining problem can bargain for the objective as a whole at a precise
moment in time. The problem can also be divided so that parts of the whole objective
become subject to bargaining during diﬀerent stages.
Unlike the classical one-stage approach towards developing bargaining problems, this
article explores a procedure subdividing the objective bargained for. Each part of the
agreement then becomes individually and sequentially negotiated. Partial agreements
∗This article, which belongs to a larger study, was done under the guidance of Professor Sergio
Monsalve, to whom I am very thankful for all his support. I also thank Mauricio P´ erez for the
revision of the english version of a preliminary draft, and for all his comments.
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leave the remaining points of disagreement for later stages. The process continues
until the whole of the objective being negotiated has been bargained for. In other
words, the procedure consists of deﬁning a bargaining agenda covering all points to
be bargained for, reaching separate agreement on each one. If, at any given stage,
agreement is not reached, the result of the process is that agreement reached in the
previous stage.
The main advantage of subdividing a bargaining problem in this way is the reduction
of the risk that the process may break down. In the words of Robert Axelrod:
“...for example, a treaty of armaments control or disarmament could be
divided in many intermediate stages; it would allow the two negotiating
parts to advance with relatively small steps instead of having to give one
or two great steps... if both parts knew that to an improper step of the
other it is possible to respond with the reciprocal decision in the following
phase, both parts would have more conﬁdence that the process will work
as it was predicted. (1984, p. 128-129)”
More speciﬁcally, he added that “having to take many small steps will help to promote
the cooperation, more than having to give just one or two very important ones.”
Schelling wrote about the importance of partial agreements in generating conﬁdence,
more than forty years ago :
“If one is able to conclude certain number of agreements, each one of
the parts can be arranged to risk a small investment with the purpose of
creating a conﬁdence tradition. The persecuted purpose is to allow that
each part demonstrates that understands the conﬁdence necessity and that
it knows that the other also understands it. Thus, if it must bargain on
an important subject, it can be necessary to look for and to bargain other
secondary questions for “practicing”; in order to establish the necessary
conﬁdence of each one of the parts in which the other understands the long
term value of the good faith. Even though the situation in the future is not
going to repeat itself, ﬁts the possibility of creating a situation equivalent
dividing the subject question to bargaining in consecutive parts.” (1960,
p. 62)
Nevertheless, this approach has received little attention in the literature. Wiener
and Winter (1999) and O´Neill, Samet, Wiener, and Winter (2003) remark that
whilst discussion on static (classic) bargaining solutions is proliﬁc, in contrast there is
little analysis of bargaining problems in which bargaining set expands gradually (i.e.
bargaining problems in which an agenda has been previously set). They suggest a
problem solution path for problems of gradual bargaining, in which the “bargaining
agenda” is considered exogenous. They further argue that, ”This intuition raises,
of course, important questions regarding the agenda. The ultimate outcome of the
bargaining depends on the way the large pie is broken into small pieces.”
This is to say that the results of the process could change, depending on the way in
which the agenda is structured.Path-Dependent Bargaining 3
When decomposing a bargaining problem into several stages, it usually turns out
that the agenda cannot be fully set a priori, or even if it is, that such an agenda
is susceptible of modiﬁcation as the bargaining process advances. It is natural to
think that the oﬀers, requests and agreements that may take place in later stages of
bargaining will be strongly related to those reached during previous stages. It may
happen that as the process advances one of the parties becomes stronger than the
other and demands more in each successive stage. It is also possible that the process
will tend to equalize the parts, so that the party that received greater beneﬁts in the
early stages of the bargaining process will make greater concessions in the later stages.
Returns may thus increase, decrease or remain constant during the negotiation. It
should be recognised when designing a model of the bargaining agenda that the process
is one in which the parties face changing conditions, partly determined by chance and
partly by the process’s history where certain of the parties’positions can gain strength
as the process advances.1.
Arthur, Ermoliev, and Kaniovski (1983, 1987) methodology will be taken as a ﬁrst ap-
proach to the problem of endogenously modelling the bargaining agenda for studying
path-dependent processes. The same analysis is valid not only for increasing returns
on scale but also for other types of returns to scale.
This paper aims to implement a mechanism making a bargaining agenda endogenous
and thus analyse possible diﬀerences in the results of bargaining situations, depending
on how an agenda has been set.
Some elements of classical bargaining theory are reviewed in the second section. The
third section presents the main aspects of Wiener and Winter’s model of gradual
bargaining (1999). Section 4 is the most important part of the article; it develops a
bargaining model having an endogenous agenda. A possible application of this model
to the negotiations which took place in 1978 between Egypt and Israel is dealt with
in section 5. Section 6 contains the general conclusions.
2 Classical Bargaining Theory
In a classical bargaining problem the result is an agreement reached between all
interested parties, or the status quo of the problem. It is clear that studying how
individual parties make their decisions is insuﬃcient for predicting what agreement
will be reached. However, classical bargaining theory assumes that each participant in
a bargaining process will choose between possible agreements, following the conduct
predicted by the rational choice model. It is particularly assumed that each player’s
preferences regarding the possible agreements can be represented by a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function.2.
1For example, Schelling (1960) emphasizes the importance in the inicial agreements in a bargaining
process with a phrase common in this type of situation:“If I yield now, you will review your opinion
about me for our future bargainings; in order to defend my reputation, I must stay right”. p.45
2I.e, it is assumed that the preferences of each agent satisfy the axioms of completeness, tran-
sitivity, independence, and continuity, in the conventional form (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green
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Nash (1950) deﬁnes a classical bargaining problem as being a set of joint allocations
of utility, some of which will correspond to that the players would obtain if they reach
an agreement, and another which represents what they would get if they failed to do
so.
In what follows we assume a bargaining problem just between two players (n = 2)3.
We can, then, formally deﬁne a bargaining game as:
Deﬁnition 1. (Bargaining Game)
A bargaining game for two players is deﬁned as a pair (F,d) where F ⊂ R2
+ is the set of
possible joint utility allocations (possible agreements), and d ∈ F is the disagreement
point4. We asume F closed, bounded, convex and comprenhensive.5
Deﬁnition 2. (Bargaining Solution)
If Λ denotes the set of all the bargaining problems in R2, a bargaining solution is a
rule φ : Λ → R
2
+ which assigns, to every bargaining problem (F,d), utility vectors
φ(F,d) = (φ1(F,d),φ2(F,d)) ∈ F (one for each agent), which corresponds to the
evaluation of his utility function in the prescribed solution.
For the deﬁnition of a speciﬁc bargaining solution is usual to follow Nash’s proposal,
setting out the axioms this solution should satisfy. Some of the most frequent axioms
used in the building of bargaining solutions are eﬃciency, symmetry, independence of
irrelevant alternatives, scalar invariance, monotonicity, etc. An exhaustive list appears
in Thomson (1994). Three of the most important solutions to classic bargaining
problems are:
Nash Bargaining Solution (Nash (1950))
The Nash bargaining solution φN(F,d) is the bargaining solution which maximizes
the product of agent´s utilities on the bargaining set:




It is easy to prove that if the Pareto frontier of F is smooth and is determined by an
equation of the form H(x,y) = 0, this frontier and the curve (x − d1)(y − d2) = t for
3There is no loss of generality in this assumption if we let as the only choices for the players the
unanimity or the full disagreement.
4R2
+ = {(x,y) ∈ R2|x ≥ 0,y ≥ 0}.
5I.e,:
i. F is convex if for all x,y ∈ F ⊂ R2, y α ∈ [0,1],αx + (1 − α)y ∈ F.
ii. F is bounded if exists a K > 0 such that for all x ∈ F,||x|| ≤ K.
iii. F is closed if {xn}n ⊆ F and xn → x, then x ∈ F
iv. F is comprenhensive if x ∈ F and x ≥ y ≥ 0, implies y ∈ F.Path-Dependent Bargaining 5
a t, have a common tangent. This is, in the Nash bargaining solution, the gradient6
of the function which determines the Pareto frontier (Hx(x,y),Hy(x,y)), and the








For situations where the players present diﬀerent “bargaining powers”7, it has been
used the generalized Nash product, where the solution maximizes the expression (x1−
d1)α(x2 − d2)β, and the parameters α,β > 0 are indicators of the bargaining power
of players 1 and 2 respectively.
Kalai - Smorodinsky Solution (Kalai and Smorodinski (1975))
Deﬁning the “ideal point” I(F,d) of a bargaining problem (F,d) where Ii(F,d) =
max{xi|x ∈ F, for all i}, the Kalai - Smorodinsky solution φK(F,d) is deﬁned as the
point in the frontier of the feasible set which connects the disagreement point to the
ideal point.







Egalitarian Solution (Kalai (1977))
The egalitarian solution φI(F,d), divides the gains of the bargaining by equal parts
between the players. Hence, for every bargaining problem, (F,d), φI(F,d) is the
vector in the frontier of F whose coordinates are equal. In general, it maximizes the
social welfare function min{x,y} on F, which implies that always y − d2 = x − d1.
3 Gradual Bargaining Model [Wiener and Winter
(1999); O´Neill, Samet, Wiener, and Winter (2003)]
A gradual bargaining problem is a process where players’ bargaining possibilities
gradually expand or shrink, determining what will henceforth be called a bargaining
agenda, formally deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 3. (Bargaining Agenda)
A bargaining agenda is a pair of functions (H,F),
H : R2
+ → R, F : R+ → R2
+









also written as (Hx,Hy).
7Because of their risk attitudes, disposable information, etc.Path-Dependent Bargaining 6
such that, for all t ∈ R+,Ft is the bargaining set
Ft = {(x,y) ∈ R2
+|H(x,y) ≤ t}
We will assume that:
i. H is continuous, diﬀerentiable with continuity, increasing in x,y and convex8
ii. F is monotone in t: if t ≤ t′ then Ft ⊆ Ft′
Deﬁnition 4. (Gradual Bargaining Problem)
A gradual bargaining problem is a triplet (H,F,d) consisting of a bargaining agenda
(H,F) and a point of disagreement d ∈ R2
+.
Once a gradual bargaining problem has been speciﬁed, then a gradual bargaining
solution becomes a rule specifying an allocation of utilities for each player at each point
in time (i.e. as bargaining set grows, a solution will consist of a path determining
players’ payoﬀs at any given moment).
Deﬁnition 5. (Gradual Bargaining Solution)
A gradual bargaining solution of the bargaining gradual problem (H,F,D) is a diﬀer-
entiable path
φ : R+ →R2
+
t →φ(t) = (x(t),y(t))
such that φ(t) ∈ F(t) for all t.
To illustrate the point, consider the case where a set of values t is enumerable, mean-
ing that the bargaining set expands discretely. A classical bargaining problem thus
becomes established during each period where the point of disagreement lies in the
allocation settled during the preceding period. Several “arbitration schemes” can be
resorted to for distributing the new objective bargained for. Two of them would be:
“Nash for Each Crumb” Arbitration Scheme
Each additional crumb in the bargaining process is distributed according to the Nash-
bargaining solution (see ﬁgure 1).
“Alternating Turns” Arbitration Scheme
A single, previously chosen, player, gets the whole crumb at each stage. The other
player gets the new crumb at next stage and they continue in this fashion ad inﬁnitum.
Figure 2 depicts an example, where the whole crumb corresponds to player 1 in stage
(t + 1) and corresponds to player 2 in (t + 2).
Deﬁnition 6. (Gradual Nash Solution)
A Gradual Nash Solution (GNS) is a gradual bargaining solution φ(t) = (x(t),y(t))








8H is convex in R2
+ if for all x,y ∈ R2




∂F(t + 1) Agreement in t
Nash Solution in t + 1
Figure 1: “Nash on each crumb” Arbitration Scheme
b b
b




Reached agreement in t
Reached agreement in t + 1
Figure 2: “Alternating Turns” Arbitration Scheme
Note that no matter how gains originating from expanding the negotiation set are
distributed, all gradual solutions satisfy the previous condition as long as each ex-
pansion is small enough. This solution can thus be given for small expansions of the
bargaining set, independently of the arbitration scheme used. For a formal exposition,
see Wiener and Winter (1999).
According to this gradual bargaining solution, the crumb favours the needier player
at each stage of distribution where “neediness” is determined by the marginal rate of
substitution between the players’ welfare (i.e. the number of units of utility player 2
must forgo to increase player 1’s welfare in 1 unit of utility while remaining within
the same set of possible agreements).
The diﬀerence between the Nash bargaining solution and the gradual Nash solution
should be emphasized. The latter favours the needier player whilst the former favours
the one less averse to risk..
Since the frontier of H is smooth and strictly increasing in x and y, the GNS will setPath-Dependent Bargaining 8
a sole solution path. The solution is assumed to be on the frontier of the feasible set
at each moment to determine the exact value of the function during each period.
4 Endogenous Bargaining Agenda
The gradual bargaining solution developed by Wiener and Winter (1999) supposes
a previously settled agenda; however, the topics normally included in bargaining at
each stage depend on previous agreements and on random events. Initial bargaining
conditions, the process’s history and unpredictable events occurring during it can aﬀect
determining the bargaining agenda. Analyzing these kinds of dynamic problems means
that one can focus on distribution or the model’s steady states as well as the paths
through the model to reach such states.
Only two players are assumed as a ﬁrst approach, both of whom are risk-neutral.9.
The following bargaining dynamic is proposed:
i. Players must decide about distributing one part of an object during the ﬁrst
stage of the bargaining process. This fraction is set exogenously.
ii. Once players have reached an agreement, they evaluate their gains in bargaining
respecting what they could have won in their individual ideal state.
iii. A player’s evaluation will determine each player’s dominant or unfavourable
position during the following stage. This situation will condition the set of
possible results during the next stages.
iv. Once this new bargaining set has been determined, the process repeats itself
from stage ii until the bargaining object has been fully negotiated.
The part of the object that will be bargained for during each stage (as well as the
number of bargaining process stages) are endogenous to the model.
4.1 The Bargaining Agenda as a Path-Dependent Process
Since this article concerns a bargaining problem where the feasible set expands gradu-
ally, but such expansion is conditional on the process’s history, a ﬁrst approach will be
made considering such expansion (the bargaining agenda) as being a path-dependent
process expanding through Nash bargaining solutions.
The bargaining sets in each stage can be deﬁned as follows as long as two risk-neutral
agents are being dealt with. In the ﬁrst stage:
F1 = {(x,y) ∈ R2
+|ax + by ≤ η} (4)
where η,a and b have been determined beforehand, and a,b,η > 0. Once we have
reach an agreement, the bargaining set expands in a direction such that only one
9A player is risk-neutral if his utility function is of the form u(w) = αw + β,α > 0.Path-Dependent Bargaining 9
of the players is beneﬁt. The size of the expansion will be δz where z is the times
that player who beneﬁts from the expansion, has been beneﬁted in the past, and
0 < δ < 110. Thus, in the second stage the bargaining set will be:
F2 = {(x,y) ∈ R2
+|ax + by ≤ η + δx} (5)
if the expansion favored player 1; or
F2′ = {(x,y) ∈ R2
+|ax + by ≤ η + δy} (6)
if the expansion favored player 2. This is shown in ﬁgure 3, where the point φ1




































Figure 3: Expansion of the Bargaining Set
























where r ≤ t is the number of times (until stage t) the bargaining set has expanded in
the direction which favors player 1, and t − r is the number of times the bargaining
set has expanded in the direction favouring player 2.
Once a bargaining set is known at each stage, a solution must be sought for each of
them. A Nash for each crumb arbitration scheme has been assumed.11. As long as
the frontier of the bargaining set is a straight line, then the slope of the line describing
the frontier and the slope of curve xy are equal in a Nash bargaining solution.
Thus, in the ﬁrst stage the equation describing the frontier of the bargaining set is








10Notice that, characterizing the expansions in this way, we are assuming each player values nearer
expansions more than the distant ones.
11Since both players are risk-neutral, the Nash bargaining solution and the Kalai-Smorodinski one
are the same in every period.Path-Dependent Bargaining 10














for players 1 and 2 respectively. This corresponds to the utilities in the ﬁrst stage of
the bargaining process.
The bargaining set will be F(2) o F(2′) in the second stage once this agreement has








if the set expands favoring player










Repeating the same argument for the next stages we get the payoﬀs series correspond-






















































































































































































Figure 4: Bargaining PathsPath-Dependent Bargaining 11







2(a + 1 −
 r
j=0 δj)
if the last expansion favored player 1,
x1








2(b + 1 −
 t−r
j=0 δj)
if the last expansion favored player 2,
x2
t−1 if the last expansion favored player 1.
Is easy to check that the feasible maximum earns for players 1 and 2, respectively, in











b + 1 −
 t
k=1 δk−1 (10)







; with a similar analysis to the one developed to ﬁnd the payoﬀs





























It may be observed that each player’s eﬀective gains, as well as their maximum gains,
are given by the values of η, a and b and by δ, (representing the magnitude of the
set’s expansion during each stage). The question, as in any path dependent process,
is whether it will stabilize in a ﬁxed path of “bargaining gains”. That is, whether
the process leads to the emergence of a macrostructure and, if so, what its structure
and emergence path will be. Modelling the bargaining agenda as a path-dependent
process tries to capture the idea that the probability of the bargaining set expanding
during a given period in the direction favouring one of the players is a given function
of the relationship between the same player’s eﬀective gains and potential gains during
previous stages. The following deﬁnition has been included to this eﬀect:
Deﬁnition 7. (Advantage on Bargaining)
In a gradual bargaining problem (H,F,d), let’s call xi
∗
t the maximum possible earn
(in utility) for player i on stage t (ex-ante), and xi
t the eﬀective earn of player i on
stage t (ex-post); the (absolute) advantage on bargaining for player i on stage t, αi
t is








si t > 1 (12)
α1
1 = α2
1 = 0.5. Note that 0 ≤ αi
t ≤ 1 for all t ≥ 1,i = 1,2Path-Dependent Bargaining 12
For example, if two bargaining stages have taken place and player 1 could have ob-
tained a maximum of 0.4 during the ﬁrst and managed to obtain it, while his potential
gains were 0.5 during the second stage but he only obtained 0.3, then his bargaining
gain is (0.4+0.3)/(0.4+0.5) =0.777. As stated above, each player evaluates his gains
regarding the ideal case up to the immediately preceding agreement (see ii).























i = 1,2; (15)
The superscript denoting a particular player is suppressed during what follows since
analysis is valid for both of them. Note that evolution of accumulated gains by a
player in stages up to period t is given by the following expression from equation
(13):
yt = yt−1 + xt; (16)
Likewise, the evolution of absolute gains from bargaining may be obtained by dividing














Replacing the values of αt+1 and y∗







Adding and reducing αt at the right side of (18) we get:

















t) (20)Path-Dependent Bargaining 13
Equation (20) describes the system’s dynamics. The conditional expected value on
αt should be calculated to observe its evolution:






The ﬁrst two terms on the equation’s right side are invariable, while the last term’s
numerator corresponds to the eﬀective gains of the player in stage t, given by equa-
tion (9). Eﬀective gain in t depends on the number of times the bargaining set has
expanded up to stage t in a way favouring that player. The expected value of such
















t (1 − pt)t−1−h (22)
where pt is the probability, on stage t, that the bargaining set will expand in the
direction favouring the chosen player.
The evolution of the gains from bargaining is then given by the dynamic discrete
system of equation (23)


























t are given by equations (10) and (11), respectively.
Once the equation determining the evolution of gains from bargaining has been speci-
ﬁed, its behaviour is then examined in the short, medium and long-term of negotiation
for a given set of parameters. An attempt is made to establish whether a long-term
structure of negotiation “emerges” and, if so, by which path it has been reached. This
is, precisely, the main result of this paper.
Theorem 1. Let (H,F,d) a gradual bargaining problem between two risk-neutral
players whose [eﬀective earnings/potential earnings] ratios are given by the discrete
system (23). Then, their long term behaviour is the egalitarian treatment, (in this
case coinciding with the Nash solution and also that of Kalai-Smorodinski); i.e.,
limt→∞ αi
t = 0.5;i = 1,2. Moreover, long term behavior depends neither on probabil-
ity pt of the set to expand in favor of one or another player, nor in a,b or δ. However,
these parameters may determine bargaining behaviour in the short and medium-term.
Proof.
It can be easily seen that succession {αt} is strictly increasing for a large enough t,
and, since {αt} is bounded, then it’s convergent.

















t (1 − pt)t−1−h
η
a + 1 −
 t
k=1 δk−1Path-Dependent Bargaining 14















t (1 − pt)t−1−h
η(1 − δ)
a − δ(a + 1) + δt+1








a − δ(a + 1) + δt+1






t (1 − pt)t−1−h (24)
Now: if we deﬁne, for h ≤ t − 1, zh ≡
 
a − δ(a + 1) + δt+1
a − δ(a + 1) + δh+1
  1
h












(ptzh)h(1 − pt)t−1−h (25)
But, since t > h, we have
1 ≥ zh ≥ zt;
where zt ≡
 
a − δ(a + 1)
a − δ(a + 1) + δt+1
  1
t















(ptzt)h(1 − pt)t−1−h = [ptzt + (1 − pt)]t−1
(26)





ln[a − δ(a + 1)] −
1
t
ln[a − δ(a + 1) + δt+1] → 0 when t → ∞
Finally, in the following discussion we will show how the parameters a,b,δ, and the
probability pt, do determine behaviour in the short and medium term.
4.2 Discussion
Once it has been established that bargaining leads to a 1/2 [eﬀective earnings/potential
earnings] ratio for each player in the long-term, then the short and medium-term path
of such advantages can be explored, depending on the model’s parameters.
The conventional distribution function for problems having binary choices will be used
for determining pt, i.e. the logistic distribution function:Path-Dependent Bargaining 15
pt = p(αt) =
1
1 + e−βαt (27)
where β ∈ R will be an exogenous factor called “external inﬂuence bargaining factor”.
Note that, if this parameter β is equal to zero (impartiality in bargaining), then there
will be an equal probability that the set will expand in favour of either of the two
players at each stage. Similarly, a higher value of β, makes expansion favouring player
1 more probable for any given value of t.
An a = b = 1 seting was used with Mathematica software for evaluating possible abso-
lute advantage paths in bargaining for diﬀerent values of δ (size of the set expansion)
and β (external inﬂuence factor on bargaining). Thus, several values for β were set,
aimed at establishing the α depending on the values for δ. Figures 5, 6 and 7 show




Figure 5: Evolution of α when β = 10
i. It can be seen from ﬁgure 5 that, when the external inﬂuence on bargaining
factor is high enough (β = 10, for example), the α value for the favoured
player remains almost unaﬀected during bargaining, showing only a very small
reduction during the ﬁrst stages of bargaining in cases where the set expansion
is high enough (δ close 0.499, in this case) but quickly stabilizing at 0.5. The
bottom panel of Figure 5 shows the evolution of α for extreme values of δ.Path-Dependent Bargaining 16
ii. A diﬀerent result is obtained when the external inﬂuence on bargaining factor
is modiﬁed (β). In particular, the path of α is represented in Figure 6 under a




Figure 6: Evolution of αt when β = 0
Note that the value of α decreases during the early stages of bargaining for all
values of δ, especially when there are large bargaining set expansions. However,
also note that α is suﬃciently near its long term value, towards the end of the
period modelled (t = 50), independently of the magnitude of expansion of the
set δ.
iii. Finally, it may be observed that when the external inﬂuence on bargaining factor
is suﬃciently large but adverse to the player in question (β = −10, in this case),
the value of α falls substantially during the early stages of bargaining. It only
reaches its long term value during the time period being analyzed if bargaining
set expansion is suﬃciently small (δ close to 0, as in Figure 7). Given enough
time and even with high values of δ, α it will eventually reaches its long term
value according with Theorem 1. A period of 1000 stages was calculated to
observe this, maintaining δ at 0.499; (Figure 8).
Two conclusions may be drawn from the above results. The larger the bargaining set
expansion, the larger short and medium-term absolute bargaining advantage ﬂuctu-




Figure 7: Evolution of αt when β = −10
bargaining set, δ, increases, the more time is required to reach the long term gain
ratio. Thus, a “stable” behaviour of the bargaining advantage can only be achieved
with small values of δ. Additionally, the eﬀect of the external inﬂuence on bargaining
factor (β) is to induce ﬂuctuations in the absolute bargaining advantage during early
stages. Its inﬂuence thus practically disappears during suﬃciently distant stages of
suﬃciently lengthy negotiations. This leads to aﬃrm that β = 0 is the long term
inﬂuence factor.
It should be emphasized that egalitarian treatment in the long term predicted by
Theorem 1 is only reached if bargaining proceeds indeﬁnitely. However it is probable
that if one of the players a suﬃciently low value of αt or, likewise, low values of
αt during several stages (as in the case of the combined eﬀect of an adverse the
external inﬂuence on bargaining factor and large expansions of the bargaining set)
then negotiation could be broken-oﬀ in the short or medium-term.
A second estimation of absolute bargaining advantage paths was undertaken for ob-
serving whether short and medium-term results were determined by choice of distri-
bution function. The probability of bargaining set expansion was thus speciﬁed as
follows:
p(αt) = ǫ + αt(1 − 2ǫ) (28)
where the role of ǫ was to equalize the bargaining advantage between the parties.
Note that if ǫ is 0.5, the probability that the bargaining set will expand to the beneﬁtPath-Dependent Bargaining 18
Figure 8: Long term evolution of α; β = −10
of either player is also equal to 0.5. Likewise, if ǫ is greater than 0.5, the probability
of a favourable expansion of the bargaining set will be less than 0.5. The opposite
happens if ǫ is less than 0.5.
The paths of the absolute bargaining advantages with p(αt), given by equation 28,




Figure 9: αt paths when ǫ = 0
Note that behaviour in the three scenarios is similar. α tends to decrease more when
the value of ǫ is lower, especially when the probability that the set will expand in his
favour coincides in each stage with his absolute bargaining advantage. These results
do not change substantially with respect to the case where p is assumed to proceed
from a logistic distribution.
The results of this paper (particularly the convenience of bargaining small crumbs at
each stage) contrast with those of Flamini (2002) whose description of each player’s
preferences regarding possible agendas suggested that a player will prefer to leave her








Figure 11: αt paths when ǫ = 1
of greatest interest to herself may be discussed ﬁrst. These results do agree in that
a disagreement can put the bargaining process in jeopardy in the case of diﬃcult
issues. Flamini has demonstrated that postponing negotiation is Pareto eﬃcient in
these cases.
A possible application of the model to the negotiations that took place between Egypt
and Israel in 1978 is now given.
5 On the Bargaining Process between Egypt, Israel
and the Arab League
The idea of unity became very important for the Arab world following United Nations
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“that the newly independent Arab states had enough in common, in shared culture
and historical experience as well as shared interests, to make it possible for them to
come into close union with each other, and such a union would not only give them
greater collective power but would bring about that moral unity between people and
government which would make government legitimate and stable” (1991, p. 401).
The Panarabist project promoted creating a country for the Palestinian people and
non-recognition of the Israeli state. The Arab League (established in 1945) became
the vehicle for Arab states’ international coordination.
When Nasser came to power and applied measures like nationalising the Suez Canal
and introduced reforms aimed at promoting redistribution of income and public own-
ership of factors of production then Egypt became the natural leader of the Arab
League. However, representing Arab interests became too heavy a burden for Egypt.
Part of the cost lay in defeats at the hands of Israel in 1956 and 1967 and occupation
of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip after the second of these wars.
Nasser’s successor Sadat (who suﬀered his own defeat at the hands of Israel in 1973)
clearly saw that the end of the conﬂict was necessary for Egypt and that it could not
be achieved by military means.
Sadat travelled to Jerusalem in November 1977 to begin bilateral talks with Israel.
This meant the dissolution of the Arab block in practice, not just because Egypt ab-
dicated its position as the head of Pan-Arabism but because negotiating with Israel
meant recognising the existence of the Jewish state. Sadat’s bargaining strategy was
built on gradualism: negotiating small pieces, or crumbs, at each stage of the process.
There had been no negotiation of any kind between the Arabs and the Israelis before
Sadat’s visit, since starting any peace process meant bargaining with the whole Arab
world for Israel; this would have been tantamount to making important concessions
regarding territories occupied during wars since 1948. Instead, negotiating bilaterally
with Egypt implied that Israel would only have to return just a part of the occupied
territories (in such context). This also opened up the possibility of starting future
negotiations with Syria and Jordan. Breaking up the bargaining object was a suc-
cessful strategy. Three years later Israel was at peace with Egypt and could begin
negotiations with its other Arab neighbours.
The peace process between Israel and Egypt (based on Kissinger’s concept of land
for peace) was also carefully divided into stages. Israel promised (in the Camp David
agreements) to evacuate the occupied territories in a ﬁrst transitory nine-month stage
after signing the peace treaty; this was to be followed by a permanent evacuation over
a lapse of three more. Each step was subdivided into a series of small retreats whose
dates had been previously accorded (the Egypt-Israel treaty, 1979).
The idea of negotiating in stages and bargaining a small fragment of the whole ob-
jective during each stage can ease conﬂicts resolution. The United States’ role in
the negotiation was also noteworthy. While the US position has always been biased
towards Israel, it seemed to have been even-handed in this case, because U.S. interest
in gaining Egypt as an ally made its stance relatively neutral.Path-Dependent Bargaining 21
6 Conclusions
It is recognised that oﬀers, demands and agreements reached during later stages are
inﬂuenced by initial negotiating conditions, previous agreements (process history) and
chance in a gradual bargaining problem. Because of this, it is thus believed that the
dynamics of bargaining can be considered as being a path-dependent process. The
results of bargaining from this perspective, and the relative position of each player
as the process advances indicate that negotiators jointly create bargaining conditions
for future stages. Some aspects of this process recall aspects of what has been named
the new “complexity economy” (Arthur (1999)).
Modelling the bargaining process as path-dependent might be questionable, given
that it does not necessarily have economies of scale (i.e. achieving superior gains in
early stages does not make superior gains more probable in later ones). However,
assuming that the objective being bargained for is distributed in accordance with a
Nash solution in each new stage involves signiﬁcant, albeit implicit, normative criteria.
Seeking resolution in each stage “compensates” the path generated by the process’s
long-term dynamics.
A natural question arising from these dynamics is what types of states emerge when
the elements of a negotiation create themselves (more particularly, which bargaining
solutions arise). This paper has demonstrated that egalitarian treatment will emerge
in the long-term under certain conditions, proper to both Nash and Kalai-Smorodinski
solutions. These results coincide with those of Binmore, Samuelson, and Young (2003)
regarding evolutionary games, where under certain conditions players will coordinate
with the Nash or Kalai-Smorodinski solutions.
Once bargainers’ long-term behaviour has been established, an attempt must be made
to learn which kinds of path lead to such states, given possible values for the model’s
parameters. It was found that small expansions in bargaining set as well as im-
partiality (absence of external inﬂuences on bargaining) would more rapidly lead to a
long-term [eﬀective earnings/potential earnings] ratio for both bargainers. It has been
demonstrated that a large expansion of bargaining set, as well as an absence of exter-
nal inﬂuence on bargaining factor substantially diﬀerent to 0, can lead to bargaining
becoming broken-oﬀ through reducing the [eﬀective earnings/potential earnings] ra-
tio which at least one of the parties would experience during the early stages of the
process.
This is a very important topic for setting initial conditions for a bargaining process.
For example, analyzing the factors that lead to a break-up of the bargaining process
between the Colombian Government and FARC guerrillas during the Pastrana Ad-
ministration, it is probable that the decision to bargain large pieces of the bargained
object in each stage (i.e., making important concessions in the earlier stages of the
process) contributed to the failure of the process. Some suggest that in the future
a “step-by-step” strategy should be followed, as for example, speciﬁc engagements
on regions, sub-units of armed groups, etc. These positions agree with the results
presented in this article.Path-Dependent Bargaining 22
It must be emphasised that the model must be improved to make it more ﬂexible
and general for improving its applicability to current political situations. Further
research is needed into generalising the model to cases where the bargainers have
diﬀerent attitudes towards risk and analysing situations where more than two players
are bargaining for a determined objective.
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